Government\u27s Obligation to Disclose Under the Truth in Negotiations Act by Pettit, Walter F. & Joseph, Allan J.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 4
Government's Obligation to Disclose Under the
Truth in Negotiations Act
Walter F. Pettit
Allan J. Joseph
Copyright c 1968 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Walter F. Pettit and Allan J. Joseph, Government's Obligation to Disclose Under the Truth in Negotiations
Act, 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 18 (1968), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss1/4
GOVERNMENT'S OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE UNDER THE
TRUTH IN NEGOTIATIONS ACT
WALTER F. PETTIT*
ALLAN J. JOSEPH**
Since its enactment in September 1962, Public Law 87-653, the
Truth in Negotiations Act,1 has been the subject of continuous and
extensive discourse. The focus of all discussion and literature to date
has been on the obligations which the Act imposes upon a contractor.
Particular emphasis has been placed upon the manner in which Gov-
ernment agencies have, by regulation and implementation, attempted
to carry out the statute's requirements. Little notice has been given to
the possibility that the Truth in Negotiations Act itself, and the at-
mosphere which it has created, may impose upon the Government cer-
tain duties of disclosure that it did not have previously.
Wholly apart from the requirements of Public Law 87-653, the
Government is obliged, under the general law, to refrain from hinder-
ing a contractor's attempted performance and also to do whatever is
necessary to enable him to perform. 2 This obligation, labeled "con-
structive condition of cooperation," 3 imposes on both parties a duty
to disclose to the other any information which is deemed essential to
the transaction. In fact, this obligation has particular application to
Government contracts.4 It has even been suggested that the Govern-
ment has a greater duty to disclose such information to contractors
than does one commercial contractor to another.5 However, tis con-
* A.B., 1941, Princeton University; LL.B., 1950, University of California; Miller,
Groezinger, Pettit, Evers & Martin, San Francisco, California; member of the Cali-
fornia bar.
** B.B.A., 1959, J.D. 1962, University of Wisconsin; Miller, Groezinger, Pettit,
Evers & Martin, San Francisco, California; member of the California and Wisconsin
bars.
1. 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (f) (1962).
2. Kehm Corp. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 620, 623 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
3. Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. Rv. 903 (1942).
4. Speidel, Implied Duties of Co-operation, and the Defense of Sovereign Acts in
Government Contracts, 51 GEO. L.J. 516, 518 (1963).
5. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REv.
833, 863-64 (1964). Patterson ascribes this to a principle of "noblesse oblige" adopted by
the Government in taking care of contractors. This point is particularly important
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clusion more likely results from the limited availability of remedies
against the Government than from a difference in substantive law.0 In
any event, it is clear that the Government does have a duty to dis-
close certain information under general legal principles.
It cannot be denied that the primary purpose of Public Law 87-653
was to provide the Government with sufficient cost information to
prevent contractors from overreaching in the pricing of noncompetitive
procurements, particularly in incentive contracts." No direct attempt
was made during congressional hearings, nor in the drafting of the
statute, to enlarge the Government's "constructive condition of co-
operation," nor to define the Government's obligation of disclosure.
Thus, the contractor, as the party rendering performance, was given
the primary obligation to present a price proposal and support that
proposal with accurate, complete and current cost or pricing data.8
Nevertheless, the Government's increasing and knowledgeable partici-
pation in price analysis in recent years and the degree of sophistication
of that analysis, may well have affected (if not changed) the con-
tractor's primary obligation and the relationship of the parties in price
negotiations. In these circumstances, there may be a greater duty of
disclosure on the part of the Government than hitherto suspected.
The two-fold purpose of this article, therefore, is:
to the duty of disclosure of a prime contractor to its subcontractors. It might be
argued by the prime contractor that his duty to disclose to subcontractors is less
than the duty of the government to disclose to its primes. However, an argument
of this kind should not be successful, since Patterson's statement relates to contract-
ors in the commercial world of trade. Subcontracts under Government prime con-
tracts bear many of the characteristics of Government contracts and are likely to
be interpreted according to the law applicable to Government contracts. American
Pipe and Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Taylor, 333 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1964).
6. Litigation among nongovernmental contracting parties involving failure to dis-
close is often brought on a tort allegation of fraud or misrepresentation. See, e.g.,
Strand v. Librascope Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743 (ED. Mich. 1961), and authorities cited
therein. However, the federal government has not waived its sovereign immunity for
suits based upon fraud or misrepresentation. 28 U.S.C. 5 2680 (h) (1946); United States
v. Gibbs, 156 F. Supp. 955 (W.D. Pa. 1957). Thus an action against the Government
must base liability upon the violation of a contract provision; in this instance, the
implied condition of co-operation.
7. For a comprehensive discussion of the Act's legislative history, see Roback, Truth
in Negotiating: the Legislative Background of P.L. 87-653, 1 PUB. CONnRACT L. J. 3
(1968).
8. Paradis, Truth in Negotiating, Public Law 87-653, 3 DEFENSE MANAGEIMENT J.
33 at 34 (1967).
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1. To examine the Government's duty of disclosure under the gen-
eral law, absent considerations of 87-653; and
2. To determine whether the scope of that duty has been enlarged,
or otherwise changed, by the passage of the Truth in Negotiations
Act.
This will be accomplished by reviewing, both under the general law
and under Public Law 87-653, the objectives of disclosure, the neces-
sity of knowledge on the part of the party charged with disclosure,
the nature of the data to be disclosed, the method of disclosure, and
the remedies for non-disclosure.
OBJECTIVE OF THE DISCLOSURE
The basic objective of Government disclosure under general con-
tract principles was discussed by the Court of Claims in Helene Curtis
Industries, Inc. v. United States.9 In that case, Helene Curtis was the
low bidder on a contract for the supply of a disinfectant chlorine
powder, to be compounded of chlormelamine and other chemical in-
gredients. Although Helene Curtis based its bid upon a simple mix-
ing process, it found it could not produce production quantities which
met the specification solubility requirements without first grinding the
chlormelamine to reduce particle sizes. This grinding process substan-
tially increased its cost, for which it sought compensation from the Gov-
ernment. The Court of Claims found that the contracting agency
knew, or should have known, that grinding would likely be required,
and that Helene Curtis expected to perform the contract without
grinding. The court, in awarding Helene Curtis damages for breach of
contract, concluded:
In this situation the Government, possessing vital information
which it was aware the bidders needed but would not have, could
not properly let them flounder on their own. Although it is not
a fiduciary toward its contractors, the Government-where the
balance of knowledge is so clearly on its side-can no more be-
tray a contractor into a ruinous course of action by silence than
by the written or spoken word.10
The purpose of disclosure as enunciated in Helene Curtis is thus to
9. 312 F.2d 774 (Cr. CI. 1963).
10. Id. at 778.
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prevent the Government from standing by while a contractor unknow-
ingly enters into a most disadvantageous situation. In another case, the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals granted the contractor re-
covery, when the silence of the Government "misled the appellant into
malting a disastrous bargain." 1
Later cases have stated the standard of disclosure in less strict terms.12
However, all cases in which relief has been granted have included the
element that the failure to disclose actively misled the contractor, and,
in each case, the purpose of requiring disclosure was to relieve the con-
tractor from the effect of such action by the Government. Conse-
quently, there has been in these cases, almost a requirement of mens
rea on the part of the Government.
The objective of disclosure under Public Law 87-653, on the other
hand, is to assist the parties in reaching a fair and reasonable price.
Disclosure is not restricted therefore, as it is under the general law, to
those unusual situations where failure to disclose misled the other party
or led him into a "disastrous bargain." This difference in objective is
significant and bears directly on the nature of the data which must be
disclosed by the Government. This will be discussed in more detail
below.
NECESSITY OF KNOW'LEDGE ON PART OF THE PARTY CHARGED
WITH DISCLOSURE
It is axiomatic that, in order to obtain relief for withholding of in-
formation under general contract law, a contractor must prove the
Government possessed pertinent information and had knowledge of
its significance. 13 Notwithstanding the apparent simplicity of this state-
ment, complicated questions arise as to what knowledge may be at-
tributed to the contracting agency.
A major problem for the contractor is that significant knowledge
may exist in a department of the Government divorced from the pro-
curing activity. The courts and boards are reluctant to impose the
11. Midvale-Heppenstall, ASBCA 7525, 65-1 BCA 4629 (1964).
12. See, e.g., Ambrose-Augusterfer Corp. v. United States, 394 F.2d 536 (Ct. Cl. 1968):
This was not a situation where the defendant alone had superior knowl-
edge of a material fact which it withheld from the plaintiff, and which it
knew plaintiff required to intelligently appraise contract expenditures. Id.
at 18 (slip opinion).
13. The burden of proof is on the contractor to show the Government's knowl-
edge. Decitron Elec. Corp., ASBCA 9660, 65-2 BCA 5149 (1965); Valveaire, Air-
craft Div., Abbotwares, ASBCA 8322, 1964 BCA 4177 (1964).
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knowledge of one department or agency upon another. Thus, the rule
has developed that the agency dealing with the contractor must have
had actual knowledge of the information which the contractor claims
was withheld. 14 1. A. Jones Construction Co. v. United States15 pro-
vides an interesting application of this principle. Jones was awarded a
construction contract by the Corps of Engineers to build facilities for
the Air Force at Cape Kennedy, Florida. During performance of this
contract, the Air Force initiated a vast, high priority ICBM construc-
tion program in the same area, authorizing the payment of premium
wages. This new program created a labor shortage, and Jones was re-
quired to pay large amounts of premium wages itself to obtain suffi-
cient workmen to complete the project. Jones then made a claim for
the additive labor cost. The Court of Claims found that the Air Force
knew, at the time Jones was awarded its contract, of the impending
ICBM program, and also knew of the premium pay authorization. Al-
though Jones' contract was with the Corps of Engineers, that orzani-
zation, the court said, was acting primarily as an agent of the Air
Force, particularly as concerned the timing and conflict of other
work."' Consequently, the Air Force, as the Corps of Engineers' princi-
pal, had a duty to disclose to Jones the impendency of the ICBM
project.
The Jones case represents a very limited departure from the basic
rule that the knowledge must be possessed by the procuring organiza-
tion. While a definite agency relationship between the procuring and
14. In a business so vast as that engaged in by the United States Government,
with its multitudinous departments, bureaus, and independent agen-
cies, with various and sundry projects scattered all over the world, it
is impossible for one department to know what another department is
going to do. In such case, it seems unreasonable to charge one agency
with knowledge of what another one is going to do. It would seem
that defendant should be held liable only if the agency that dealt with
plaintiff had knowledge of the impending employment of this huge labor
force. Bateson-Stolte, Inc. v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 454, 457 (Cr. Cl.
1959), 305 F.2d 386 (Ct. CI. 1962).
See also S.T.G. Constr. Co., 157 Ct. Cl. 409 (1962); Bethlehem Corp., ASBCA
10595, 66-1 BCA 5641 (1966).
15. 390 F.2d 886 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
16. In this way, the court distinguished the two Bateson-Stolte cases, where the
Corps of Engineers was the contracting and the using agency, and the knowledge
was possessed by the Atomic Energy Commission. The court in those cases did
not find an agency relationship, but rather found that the two organizations were
independent.
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knowledgeable organization may not be required, Jones states that there
must be a "significant bond between the two organizations." 
17
A bond of this kind was found by the Armed Services Board of Con-
tract Appeals in the case of Cryo-Sonics, Inc.' In that case, a bidder
on an Air Force procurement made reference to a report developed
by another Air Force Command. This report, upon which the con-
tractor relied, was incomplete. The Board found a sufficient bond be-
tween the two Air Force Commands by means of the reference by the
contractor to the incomplete report:
We agree with the government that the knowledge of one or-
ganizational element of the Air Force would not automatically
be imputed to every other organizational element of the Air
Force, no matter how remote. In this particular instance, any
gap between the organizational elements of the Air Force was
bridged by the reference in appellant's proposal to the WADD
report.19
While knowledge will not be imputed from one Government agency
to another, constructive knowledge may be imposed where the infor-
mation was available in the procuring agency itself. The Court of
Claims has ruled in Traiws Womack v. United States"° that a Govern-
ment contracting agency is liable not only for actual knowledge in its
possession, but also for what it would have learned through reasonable
investigation. In Womack, the Government furnished bidders with an
estimate of data to be processed under the contract. This estimate was
grossly understated, and did not reflect the information which was rea-
sonably available to the Government agents. The court held that a
negligent misrepresentation is as actionable as an intentional one, and
where the Government furnishes an estimate for assistance to bidders,
the estimate must be based on all relevant information that is reason-
ably available to the Government.
Notwithstanding the apparent broad reach of the Womack case, the
extent to which constructive knowledge will be imposed upon the
Government is limited. The Court of Claims has indicated that the
Government need not go to extreme measures to obtain the data. In
17. 390 F.2d at 892.
18. ASBCA 11483, 66-2 BCA 5890 (1966).
19. Id. at 27,331-27,332.
20. - Ct. C1. - (1968).
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Evans Reamer & Machine Co. v. United States,21 the contractor con-
tended that the Government should have disclosed problems experi-
enced by another contractor on a similar procurement. The Court de-
nied relief on that ground, stating:
From the foregoing it is clear that as of the end of February
1955, when Evans' contract was fully executed, the contracting
officer had only surmises, not verified facts, as to the nature of
Aircraftsmen's problems. Obviously, he cannot be charged with
fraud, either actual or constructive, in failing to disclose "facts"
which he did not actually know to be facts. 2
Consequently, the current state of the general law of disclosure,
based upon the Womack and Evans Reamer cases, is that the Govern-
ment must disclose only that knowledge which is factual, and is not
required to verify and then disclose that which is mere conjecture.
As stated earlier, neither Public Law 87-653, nor the regulations un-
der it, define the Government's duties of disclosure. Thus, it is neces-
sary to refer to the contractor's obligations under the statute and regu-
lations, in order to determine by analogy the degree to which knowl-
edge might be inputed to the Government under 87-653. Such reference
by analogy is consistent with decisions of the Comtproller General, in
which it is indicated that the statute imposes duties on the Govern-
ment, similar to those imposed on the Contractor. 8
The relevance of the contractor's knowledge that the data is defec-
tive has been an important issue since the statute was first considered.
The Act was originally conceived as a type of fraud provision, to pre-
vent over-reaching by contractors in stating their costs. Consequently,
good arguments can be made that the purpose of the statute would be
satisfied if the Government's right to a deductive price change were to
be limited to situations where the contractor knew its data was defec-
tive. This position appears to be supported by that portion of the stat-
ute which requires the contractor "to certify that, to the best of his
knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing data be submitted was ac-
curate, complete and current." 24 (Emphasis added.)
21. 386 F.2d 873 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
22. Id. at 882.
23. Comp. Gen. Dec. B-156313, August 31, 1967 (Unpublished); Comp. Gen. Dec.
B-162387, December 11, 1967 (Unpublished). These decisions are discussed in greater
detail at the next accompanying footnotes 57 through 60, infra.
24. 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (1) (1948).
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However, the statutory language which requires the inclusion in the
contract of a clause allowing price adjustment where there was inac-
curate, incomplete or noncurrent data, does not limit the Government's
remedy to situations where the contractor had knowledge that the data
was defective. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has
ruled that the price adjustment can be obtained under the contract
clause by itself, without resort to the certificate. 25 Further, most com-
mentators, based on the total legislative history, have expressed the
view that it is immaterial whether the defective data resulted from ad-
vertence or inadvertence.26 It is, therefore, the prevailing view that the
knowledge or motivation of the contractor with respect to accuracy,
currency, or completeness is not pertinent to the question of defective
pricing.
Consequently, the current DOD regulations have included within the
definition of cost or pricing data to be disclosed "all facts existing up
to the time of agreement on price which prudent buyers and sellers
would reasonably expect to have a significant effect on the price negoti-
ations." 27 The regulations go on to provide guidance as to what data
might be regarded as reasonably available on the date that agreement
is reached on price, stating that closing or cut-off dates should be in-
cluded as part of the data submittedY.2  This is consistent with deci-
sions arising under the pre-statute contract clause requiring disclosure
of all "reasonably available" data. In these cases, the Board, considering
all the circumstances of the contractor's organization, established a cut-
off date, and determined that data acquired by the contractor's or-
ganization after this date was not reasonably available to the contrac-
tor's negotiators.
Further elaboration of the degree to which a party is charged with
disclosure under 87-653 is provided by Lockheed Aircraft Corp.30 In
this case, the Government claimed that a subcontractor had failed to
disclose material purchases made prior to agreement on price. The sub-
contractor contended that because of the complexity of its accounting
25. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., ASBCA 10453, 67-1 BCA 6356 (1967).
26. Roback, supra note 7, at 23-4, 27-8; Note, 54 U. Va. L. REv. 505, 511-13 (1968).
27. ASPR 3-807.3 (e). As amended by defense procurement circular no. 57, dated
Nov. 30, 1967.
28. ASPR 3-807.5 (a) (1). As amended by defense procurement circular no. 57, dated
Nov. 30, 1967.
29. American Bosch Anna Corp., ASBCA 10305, 65-2 BCA 5280 (1965); FMC
Corp., ASBCA 10095, 66-1 BCA t 5483 (1966).
30. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., ASBCA 10453, 67-1 BCA T 6356 (1967).
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system, and because of numerous changes in the product, this data was
not reasonably available. The Board held that the subcontractor should
have developed this information, stating that "[i]t would not be un-
reasonable to expect the subcontractor to have reviewed all of the avail-
able purchase orders, even though it may have taken a week or two or
even three to complete that survey." 3'
Should these principles under Public Law 87-653 be applied to the
Government, the Government would incur new areas of liability for
non-disclosure. While under general legal principles the contractor
must show possession of the knowledge on the part of the procuring
agency, under 87-653 the contractor would merely have to show that
the data was reasonably available to the contracting agency.
NATURE OF THE DATA TO BE DISCLOSED
Once a duty has been established, there remains the question of how
much, and what kind of, data must be disclosed. Obviously, a cate-
gorical answer, responsive to every situation which might arise, is not
possible. Instead, the issue must be analyzed in light of the objective
to be accomplished by disclosure. Thus, under general contract princi-
ples the Government need not disclose all knowledge in its possession,
since this would impose an unreasonable burden on the Government.32
Rather, the Government must disclose that knowledge which will
achieve the objective of preventing the contractor from being misled
into an unfair bargain. By comparison, the nature of data to be dis-
closed under Public Law 87-653 is determined by a different objective-
that of enabling the parties to reach a fair and reasonable price.
Nature of Data Under General Law
In the Helene Curtis case, the Court of Claims stated that the Gov-
ernment must disclose to bidders "vital information," which it knows
the bidders need.33 The term "vital information" would have been a
convenient one to use in describing the Government's obligation to dis-
close. However, this term has not been carried forward in later cases.
In some instances a much less restrictive test has been utilized in assess-
ing liability against the Government. In the appeal of S. Patti Construe-
31. Id. at 29,447.
32. Speciality Assembly & Packing Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 554 (Ct. Cl.
1966); Kollsman Instrument Corp., ASBCA 8633, 65-1 BCA T 4531 (1964).
33. 312 F.2d at 778 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
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tion Co., the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals stated the
test as follows:
Where the contracting agency has exclusive knowledge that 'will
materially affect the cost of performing the work, it has the duty
to disclose such knowledge to its contractors.34 (Emphasis added.)
Consequently, the "label" attached to the data is not particularly help-
ful in defining the Government's obligations. A more significant mea-
sure of that obligation is the extent to which the Government is aware
of the consequences of non-disclosure. The greater the awareness, the
more likely that the Government will be charged with a duty to dis-
close. This of course is consistent with the objective of requiring dis-
closure; namely, to prevent the contractor from being misled into an
unfair bargain. The application of this principle can best be illustrated
by taking a number of situations which have been litigated, and analyz-
ing the results obtained in those cases.
1. Item furnished by the Government. When the Government fur-
nishes one of the items required for performance, its failure to disclose
information about that item will likely subject it to liability.3 Thus,
in the S. Patti Construction Co. case, the contractor was to build a
structure to receive certain equipment supplied by the Government.
The Government knew at the time of bidding, but failed to disclose,
that the design of this equipment was not finalized. Therefore, the
Government delayed the contractor's performance while completing
the equipment design. The Board held that this failure to disclose ren-
dered the delay unreasonable under the contract suspension of work
clause, thereby entitling the contractor to compensation.30
34. ASBCA 8423, 1964 BCA 4225, 20,505 (1964). See also Big 4 Paving Inc., AEC CA-
176 (1964):
[When] the government has or reasonably should have superior knowl-
edge of matters material to an understanding of the work involved, it
has a positive duty to reveal [such knowledge] before the submission and
acceptance of a bid.
35. Kaiser Industries Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 322 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (suit-
ability of rock in Government owned quarry); Sidran Sportswear Co., ASBCA 9557,
65-1 BCA 4632 (1965) (defective pattern for uniform jackets). In this situation,
it may not be necessary for the contractor to argue that the Government withheld
information, if he can obtain an equitable adjustment under the Government-fur-
nished property clause of the contract.
36. S. Patti Constr. Co., ASBCA 8423, 1964 BCA 4225 (1964). See also Con-
solidated Electrodynamics Corp., ASBCA 6732, 1963 BCA 3806 (1963), where the
Government did not discourage the contractor from continuing work on a cost re-
1968]
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Similarly, where the Government furnishes information to bidders
to assist in the preparation of bids, the failure to furnish complete in-
formation will render the Government liableY One case, Synder-Lynch
Motors, Inc. v. United States,38 is particularly pertinent to the subject
of this article. In that case, the Government approached Synder-Lynch
to bid on a contract for rebuilding engines. The Government had con-
siderable experience with respect to another contractor who had done
this work. Synder based part of its bid on the Government's advice
that the parts cost per unit was about $800. In fact, as the Government
knew from its experience, that amount was inadequate. The actual
parts cost to Synder was nearly two and one-half times the estimate.-
The court found that the Government's withholding of this cost in-
formation constituted a breach of contract, entitling Synder-Lynch to
recover damages.4 °
2. Actions by the Government hindering performance. Of course,
the Government is subject to the implied contractual condition that it
will not take action which hinders or delays the contractor's perform-
ance. A breach of this condition entitles the contractor to recover dam-
ages.41 However, if the hindering action is done in its sovereign (as
opposed to its contracting) capacity, the Government is not answerable
in damages to the contractor for such sovereign acts.42  Notwithstand-
imburseable contract past the cost limitation, while failing to advise contractor that
no effort was being made to obtain additional funding.
37. Womack v. United States, - Ct. Cl. - (1968). A number of cases hold
that when the Government has made borings to determine subsurface conditions, it
must disclose the result of those borings. General Casualty Co. v. United States,
127 F. Supp. 805, 809 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Raineri v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 494, 506,
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 609 (1942); Ragonese v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 768 (Ct. Cl.
1954); Potashnick v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 837 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
38. 292 F.2d 907 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
39. The court used the phrase "145.5 percent over and above the estimated re-
quirements." Id. (emphasis added). The court apparently was stating 245.5 percent
of the estimate.
40. The measure of damages was Synder-Lynch's "unrecovered indirect costs of
procuring the tank engine parts" of $87,587.06. Id. at 910. This apparently repre-
sented the difference between Synder-Lynch's actual cost of procurement of the
parts and the $800 estimate per unit. There is no indication in the opinion as to
whether the Government knew, at the time of bidding, the extent to which the
estimate was low.
41. See, e.g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. United States, 369 F.2d 701 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
42. Speidel, supra note 4. Such sovereign acts are acts of the Government beyond
the control and without the fault of the contractor, and as such do provide a basis
for excusable delay. Acme Missiles & Constr. Corp., ASBCA 11794, 68-1 BCA V 6734
(1968).
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ing, if the procuring agency knew at the time of contract execution of
the likelihood of such acts, sovereign or not, it has a duty to advise the
contractor. Failure to do so renders the Government liable.
43
3. Problems encountered by other contractors on similar work. Fre-
quendy, similar problems have been experienced by other contractors
on earlier procurements. In some cases, the precise nature of these
problems has not been transmitted to the Government, and there is
therefore no duty to disclose to a later contractor." On the other hand,
where the Government's information is fairly well defined, the duty
to disclose is present, particularly where the information was developed
as a result of research sponsored by the Government.4"
A particular difficulty arises where the Government has acquired
proprietary knowledge from a previous contractor. In this situation,
the Government has conflicting obligations. On one hand, the Gov-
ernment may be prohibited from disclosing a contractor's propietary
data to its competitors.46 On the other hand, there is a duty to disclose
important information to bidders. The Court of Claims has hinted, in
dictum, that the Government may be excused from disclosure in this
situation. However, with respect to technical data, it might well be
argued that liablity for nondisclosure is a risk that must be borne by
43. Bateson-Stolte, Inc. v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 454, 457 (Ct. Cl. 1959);
J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 390 F.2d 886 (Ct. CI. 1968). See discussion of the J. A. Jones
case at text accompanying notes 15-17, supra.
44. Robertson Elec. Co. v. United States, 176 Ct. Cl. 1287, 1295-6 (1966); Evans
Reamer & Machine Co. v. United States, 386 F.2d 873 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
45. Cryo-Sonics, Inc., ASBCA 11483, 66-2 BCA 5890 (1966); Sidran Sportswear
Co., ASBCA 9557 65-1 BCA 4632 (1965). But cf. Speciality Assembly Packing Co.
v. United States, 355 F.2d 554 (Ct. Cl. 1966) where relief was denied, although at
the time the contract was awarded, the procuring agency was aware that another
contractor was experiencing difficulties with the test procedures. Recovery was denied
on the basis that the procuring agency was not aware of any suitable alternate pro-
cedures. The result in this case is questionable, since the contractor's claim was
probably that it would have increased its price if it had known of the problem with
the test procedure.
46.18 U.S.C. §1905 (1940); ASPR 9-201(b) (1968); NASAPR 9.202-2(b)(1);
Padbloc Co. v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 369 (1963); 43 Comp. Gen. 193 (1963); 42
Comp. Gen. 346 (1963); 41 Comp. Gen. 148 (1961); Comp. Gen. Dec. B-143711, 21
June 1961 (Unpublished).
47. Evans Reamer & Machine Co. v. United States, 386 F.2d 873, 882 n. 12,
(Ct. CI. 1967):
There may be merit in the government's alternative contention that,
even assuming the contracting officer was possessed of relevant facts re-
garding Aircraftsmen's troubles, he was not at liberty legally to disclose
those facts to a competitor such as Evans.
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the Government for placing the procurement involving such proprietary
data on a competitive basis. The Government does have the alternative
of purchasing the rights in the information from the data owner.48 The
bidder being unaware of the existence of the information has no such
opportunity.
4. Extensive research & development required. In certain circum-
stances, the Government, knowing that the contract involves a sub-
stantial amount of research and development work, has a duty to dis-
close that fact to the contractor. This is particularly true where the
circumstances of the contract indicate that primarily a production ef-
fort is involved.49 Such circumstances would include a short delivery
schedule, precluding extensive research and development,50 or the fact
that the contract was formally advertised, on a fixed price, and set
aside for small businesses. 51 However, unless it is aware of development
problems, the Government is not required to advise prospective contrac-
tors that the article being procured has never before been produced. 2
5. Capability of contractor. In a few cases the contractor has claimed
that the Government should have advised him that he did not have
the capability to perform the work. This claim has not been success-
ful, since the premise is that the contractor, and not the Government,
is the best judge of his own capability. As stated by the Armed Serv-
ices Board of Contract Appeals:
Basically, the responsibility is on the bidder to ascertain what
is called for by an invitation for bids and whether he has the
technical and financial facilities to produce the item sought. To
vary this rule takes a showing so strong that it goes almost to
the point of being able to find that the bidder COULD not
know that he was incapable of performing and, further, that
the Government knew that he could not know.53
48. See, e.g., ASPR 9-202.2 (g) (1968). Where the information received from the
previous contractor is proprietary cost data, there would be greater reason to recog-
nize the Government's right to withhold, since the Government cannot purchase
rights in such data.
49. Helene Curtis v. United States, 312 F.2d 774. (Ct. Cl. 1963).
50. Midvale-Heppenstall, ASBCA 7525, 65-1 BCA 4629 (1964).
51. Johnson Elec., Inc., ASBCA 9366, 65-1 BCA 4628 (1965).
52. Decitron Elec. Corp., ASBCA 9660, 65-2 BCA 5149 (1965). See also Helene
Curtis v. United States, 312 F.2d, 774, 779, n. 2 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
53. Valveaire, Aircraft Div. Abbotwares, ASBCA 8322, 1964 BCA 4177, 20,334
(1964). See also Aerosonic Corp., ASBCA 11344, 67-1, BCA 6178 (1967); Washing-
ton Scientific Instruments, Inc., ASBCA 9384, 65-1 BCA 4743 (1965).
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Nature of Data Under P.L. 87-653
As stated above, the objective of disclosure under Public Law 87-
653 is to make available sufficient information to enable the parties to
reach a fair and reasonable price. The nature of the data to be dis-
closed under the statute must be guided by this objective.
There is some published indication of the nature of the data which
the Government must disclose under Public Law 87-653. The most
limited description of this obligation is stated in ASPR 3.807.5 (b):
If at any time prior to agreement on price the contracting of-
ficer learns through audit or otherwise that any cost or pricing
date submitted is inaccurate, incomplete or non-current, he shall
immediately call it to the attention of the contractor whether
that defective data tends to increase or decrease the contract
price.
The obligation, as expressed in this regulation, standing alone would
not greatly increase the Government's duty to disclose. It appears to
be similar to the contractor's duty to call apparent ambiguities in speci-
fications to the attention of the contracting officer, if the contractor
wishes the specification to be interpreted in his favor.5 4 It also bears
resemblance to the duty of the contracting officer to call an obvious
bidding error to the attention of a bidder.55 The basic principle is
that the Government may not snap up an offer too good to be true.5
The apparent purpose of ASPR 3.807.5 (b) quoted above is similar.
The Government may not let an obvious error in cost or pricing data
pass, without notifying the contractor of the error.
But, does the Government's duty go beyond the apparent limita-
tions of ASPR 3.807.5 (b)? The Comptroller General has indicated
that it may. Although the decision dealt only with a contractor's al-
leged failure to disclose pertinent data, the Comptroller has stated:
We believe, however, that Public Law 87-653, the Truth in
Negotiations Act, requires that all significant cost or pricing data
54. Blount Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 962 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Beacon
Constr. Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 501 (Ct. CI. 1963); WPC Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States, 323 F.2d 874 (Ct. CI. 1963).
55. Chernick v. United States, 372 F.2d 492 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Doke, Mistakes in GoC~-
eminent Contracts-Error Detection Duty of Contracting Officers, 18 S.W. L.J. 1
(1964); Welch, Mistakes in Bids, 18 Fao. B.J. 75 (1958).
56. Wender Presses, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 961 (Cr. C. 1965).
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available to one party to contract price negotiations be com-
pletely disclosed to the other party so that they may negotiate
on equal terms and establish a price that will be fair and reason-
able to both.57
In a later case, the Comptroller General was faced with a failure to
disclose by the Government:" The Government had issued an RFQ
for aircraft maintenance services, the contract to be awarded upon
a cost-plus-incentive-fee basis." The procurement agency, in analyzing
the three bids received, determined that all bidders had greatly under-
estimated the cost of performing the work. Therefore, the target cost
of each bidder was grossly understated, in effect precluding any
bidder to whom an award might be made from receiving other than
the minimum fee. As a result, award of the contract was made solely
upon the basis of the lowest minimum fee. A bidder, who did not
receive the award, protested to the Comptroller General. The Comp-
troller found that the procuring agency improperly based its total
evaluation upon the minimum fee, and should have disclosed to all bid-
ders its opinion that their target costs were too low:
We strongly feel that the circumstances required, under the
mandate of Public Law 87-653, full and meaningful cost negoti-
ations with the competitive offerors as a prerequisite to award
to that offeror who had submitted the lowest profit proposal
which was related to a higher estimated contract price deter-
mined to be "unrealistic". The legislative history of Public Law
87-653 discloses that one of its primary purposes was to require
full, complete and accurate data and disclosure by both parties
in pricing discussions of incentive contracts in particular and to
require the contractor to certify to the cost figures in hand at
the time of negotiations for target price.60
Consequently, insofar as the nature of the data to be disclosed is con-
cerned, the Comptroller General seems to be imposing on the Govern-
ment a duty similar to that imposed on contractors. Thus, the Gov-
57. Comp. Gen. Dec. B-156313, August 31, 1967 (unpublished).
58. Comp. Gen. Dec. B-162387, December 11, 1967 (unpublished).
59. Under this type of contract, the parties establish a target cost, target fee and
minimum and maximum fee. The contractor's target fee is increased (up to the maxi-
mum fee) by a pre-established portion of the cost below the target cost. Similarly,
if the contractor's cost is greater than the target cost, his fee is decreased by sub-
tracting from the target fee (down to the minimum fee) a portion of that overrun.
60. Comp. Gen. Dec. B-162387, supra, note 8, at 12.
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eminent might be expected to disclose all data in its possession "which
prudent buyers and sellers would reasonably expect to have a sig-
nificant effect on the price negotiations." ' The scope of such data
may be much broader than the scope of the data which the Govern-
ment must disclose under general legal principles. Thus, such data
might include information which accounts for a relatively small por-
tion of the contract price.5 It may also include information, the value
of which is somewhat in doubt at the time of contract execution.'
3
As to particular items to be disclosed, the one most frequently aris-
ing is likely to be the Government's audit of the contractor's pro-
posed price. By means of this audit, and its other pre-contract analysis,
the Government frequently has a better understanding of the accuracy,
completeness, and currency of the contractor's costs than does the
contractor." In light of the objective of 87-653, it would seem that
the audit, and the Government's accompanying analysis, ought to be
revealed to the contractor.
Another specific item which frequently occurs is knowledge on the
part of the Government of another contractor's experiences in per-
forming a similar contract, particularly with respect to the costs of
performance. Even assuming the propriety of disclosing such informa-
tion to another contractor,0 5 there is a real question of efficacy since
the method of accounting for costs may vary so widely from con-
tractor to contractor that disclosure might be meaningless.
The two specific items listed above are not intended to encompass
all areas in which the Government might be required to disclose under
Public Law 87-653. Rather, disclosure might be held to be the rule as
to any data in the Government's possession which is needed by the
contractor to assist in the negotiation of a fair price.
ASSUMING DIscLosURE Is REQUIRED, WHAT IS THE METHOD
AND EXTENT OF DIscLosuRE
Since the purpose of disclosure under the general law is to prevent
the contractor from being misled by the Government, the contractor
61. ASPR 3-807.3e. As amended by defense procurement circular no. 57, dated Nov.
30, 1967.
62. Cf. American Bosch Arma, ASBCA 10305, 65-2 BCA 5280 (1965); FMC
Corp., ASBCA 10095, 66-1 BCA 5483 (1966).
63. Cf. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., ASBCA 10900, 67-2 BCA 6432 (1967).
64. The auditor's procedures are described in ASPR 3-809. See also Vick, Role of
Defense Contract Audit Agency under P.L. 87-653, 1 PuB. CoNmAcT L. J. 58 (1968).
65. See note 48, supra.
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must show that he was in fact misled by the failure to disclose, and
that disclosure would have benefitted him."6 Similarly, the contractor
must prove that the information possessed by the Government was
relevant to the difficulties experienced by him. For example, in Natus
Corporation v. United States, 7 the contractor was unable to mass pro-
duce the article required in the manner indicated in a contract draw-
ing. He claimed that the Government withheld information as to the
difficulty in mass producing under this method. However, the Court
of Claims denied recovery, finding that the Government's knowledge
was obtained solely through experimentation in prototypes, and as
such, did not relate to mass production problems.
Under general legal principles, the Government has no duty to dis-
close information which the contractor knew or should have known.
Where the contractor had actual knowledge, the case is clear." The
only problem will be one of proof. However, the situation is more
difficult when the Government asserts that the contractor should have
known-in other words, that the contractor had "constructive knowl-
edge." The major determinative is the relative ease or difficulty by
which the contractor could have obtained the information. Thus,
where the data is readily available as a matter known in the trade,9
or from an equipment supplier,70 or upon a reasonable site investiga-
tion,"' the contractor is likely to be charged with constructive knowl-
edge. At the other extreme, if the data is classified, or otherwise re-
tained under Government control, the contractor would obviously not
be expected to have obtained it."2
The cases do make clear that the Government's obligation to dis-
close is an affirmative duty, and is not dependent upon a request for
disclosure by the contractor."3 In this respect the Government's duty
66. Robertson Elec Co. v. United States, 176 Ct. CI. 1287 (1966) (information when
finally disclosed did not solve the problem); Decitron Elec. Corp., ASBCA 9660,
65-2 BCA 1 5149 (1965).
67. 371 F.2d 450 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
68. Air Terminal Services, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 974 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
69. Washington Scientific Instruments, Inc., ASBCA 9384, 65-1, BCA 4743 (1965).
70. Alvey Ferguson Co., ASBCA 11067, 66-2 BCA T 5833, (1966); The Bethlehem
Corp., ASBCA 10595, 66-1 BCA 5641 (1966).
71. Hunt & Willett Inc. v. United States, 35 F.2d 980 (Ct. Cl. 1964); R. E. Lee
Elec. Co., ASBCA 10800, 65-2 BCA 5262 (1965); Ambrose Augusterfer Corp. v.
United States, 394 F.2d 536 (1968).
72. J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. United States, 390 F.2d 886 (Ct. CI. 1968).
73. Helene Curtis v. United States, 312 F.2d 774 (Ct. CI. 1963). The contractor
may be required to ask for the information where it should have known that data
was available. See Ray D. Bolander Co., IBCA 331, 65-2 BCA 5224 (1965).
[Vol. 10: 18
GOVERNMENT'S OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE
to disclose can be distinguished from its obligations under the Freedom
of Information Act, where disclosure is dependent upon specific request
for identifiable records.74
A somewhat difficult situation exists where the Government dis-
closes the basic data, but withholds its own conclusions from that
data. While the point might be made that the Government ought to
disclose the entire package, the reported cases appear to release the
Government from liability in this situation. The contractor is charged
with the knowledge he would have obtained by developing the con-
clusion from the data submitted.75 Presumably, however, the more
esoteric the data, and the more expertise required to reach the con-
clusion, the greater the Government's duty to disclose that conclusion.
As to form, the general law prescribes no particular method of dis-
closure. Since actual or constructive knowledge by the contractor ex-
cuses disclosure by the Government, any means of communication by
the Government to the contractor should be sufficient.
Neither Public Law 87-653 nor its implementing regulations indi-
cate the method, extent or form of disclosure required of the govern-
ment. Consequently, attention must be focused once again upon the
requirements imposed upon contractors under the Act. In all respects
it would appear that the requirement of disclosure under 87-653 is
more stringent than under general legal principles.
The current thinking of the Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
peals is that constructive knowledge on the part of the Government
does not discharge the contractor's affirmative obligations under the
statute. Therefore, it is not sufficient for the contractor merely to
make available to the Government the records containing the relevant
data. Rather, the data itself must be prepared and presented to the gov-
ernment.76
The second area of difference between disclosure under the con-
tract condition of cooperation and disclosure under 87-653 is that of
causation, or burden of proof. As described above, under general legal
principles, the contractor must prove he was misled by the Govern-
ment's failure to disclose. The Truth in Negotiations Act itself con-
tains similar language. It states that the price to the Government shall
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (3) (1946).
75. L. M. Jones Co. v. United States, - Ct. Cl. - (1967); T. F. Sholes Inc. v.
United States, 357 F.2d 963, 970 (Ct. C1. 1966); John F. Burke Engineering & Constr.,
ASBCA 8182, 1963 BCA 3713 (1963).
76. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., ASBCA 10453, 67-1 BCA 6356 (1967).
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be reduced to exclude "any significant sums by which it may be de-
termined ... that such price was increased because the contractor...
furnished cost or pricing data which . . . was inaccurate, incomplete
or noncurrent. . . ." Consequently, the statute does appear to impose
upon the Government the burden of showing that the furnishing of
defective data caused the price to increase by significant sums, and to
prove the extent of that increase.77 However, this burden has been so
shaped by the decisions of the Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
peals and the implemeting regulations as to make it significantly less
than that demanded under general legal principles. As stated by the
Board in the Cutler-Hammer, Inc. case:
In Defense Electronics, Inc., . . . we held that the Government
had the burden of proving the causal relationship between sig-
nificant, non-disclosed, pricing data and the resulting contract
price reduction. However, we did not then, nor do we here, in-
tend that that burden be an unreasonably heavy one. Accord-
ingly, under the circumstances of this appeal and on the entire
record, we are of the opinion that the Government has estab-
lished the reasonable probability that with a disclosure of the
Transco quotation [the data in question], the parties would have
agreed that the cost of the Luneberg Lens would be excluded
from the contract price. 78
The Armed Services Procurement Regulations go even farther, stat-
ing:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the natural and prob-
able consequences of defective data is an increase in the con-
tract price in the amount of the defect plus related burden and
profit or fee; therefore, unless there is a clear indication that
the defective data was not used, or was not relied upon, the
contract price was reduced in that amount.79
This regulation appears to have almost shifted the burden of proof to
the contractor to show non-reliance on the part of the Government.o
77. Defense Elec. Inc., ASBCA 11127, 66-1 BCA 5604, recon. den., 66-1 BCA
5668 (1966).
78. Cutler Hammer, Inc., ASBCA 10900, 67-2 BCA 6432, at 28,829 (1967). See
also Bell & Howell Co., ASBCA 11999, 68-1 BCA 6993 (1968).
79. ASPR 3-807.5(a) (2). As amended by defense procurement circular no. 57,
dated Nov. 30, 1967.
80. It has been suggested that the causation requirement was an unworkable limi-
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Finally, as to the form of disclosure, a more defined structure is re-
quired under 87-653 than under general contract law. This is pri-
marily due to the statutory obligation of the contractor to certify the
data he has submitted. Applying an analogous requirement of certifi-
cation on the Government, as to data submitted to the contractor,
would not be supportable under the statute or regulations. How-
ever, it can certainly be contended that disclosure by the Govern-
ment under 87-653 must be made in a more substantial and concrete
form, than disclosure in compliance with the constructive condition
of cooperation. 81
REMEDIES FOR NoN-DISCLOSURE
The Government's failure to fulfill its obligation of disclosure under
general provisions of the contract provides the contractor with a num-
ber of avenues of relief. The failure to disclose is a breach of the
contractual constructive condition of cooperation, and the contractor
may bring an action in damages for that breach of contract.82 Non-
disclosure may also provide the contractor with an excuse for the
Government's termination of the contract for default.83 Finally, the
contractor may secure relief under the contract changes clause by
obtaining an equitable adjustment, on the theory of a constructive
change.84
Public Law 87-653 makes no provision for a price increase based upon
Government non-disclosure. Therefore, the remedies for non-disclosure,
with one exception, would be similar to the remedies under the general
law. That exception might occur in a situation where the Government
claims that there was non-disclosure by the contractor, and demands a
price reduction on the premise that had the contractor made disclosure,
there would have been a reasonable basis for negotiating a lower price.
If the Government also failed to disclose information on the item in
question, the contractor might defend the Government's demand for
tation upon enforcement of the Statute, since contracts are usually negotiated on a
total price basis. Note, supra note 26, at 521.
81. Cf. Bell & Howell Co, ASBCA 11999, 68-1 BCA t 6993 at 32,344 (1968).
82. J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. United States, 390 F.2d 886 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Helene
Curtis v. United States, 312 F.2d 774 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Bateson-Stolte Inc. v. United
States, 172 F. Supp. 454, 457 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
83. Sidran Sportswear Co. Inc., ASBCA 9557, 65-1 BCA 4632 (1965).
84. Cryo-Sonics, Inc., ASBCA 11483, 66-2 BCA 5890 (1966); Johnson Electronics,
Inc., ASBCA 9366, 65-1 BCA 4628 (1965); Midvale-Heppenstall Co., ASBCA 7525,
65-1 BCA 4629 (1965).
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a price reduction by the assertion that if the Government had made
full disclosure during negotiations, the contractor would have had a
reasonable basis for increasing the price.
SUMMARY
Whether the Government's duty to disclose information to a con-
tractor has been enlarged by the passage of the Truth in Negotiations
Act is speculative at this time. A definitive position may not be taken
until these issues have been subjected to litigation.
However, this much can be said: if there is a duty imposed upon
the Government to disclose under Public Law 87-653, then the Gov-
ernment's obligation is significantly broader than it is under general
legal principles. This is caused primarily by the difference in objec-
tives between the general law and the Truth in Negotiations Act. Un-
der general legal principles, the objective is to prevent a contractor
from being misled into an unfair bargain by the Government's silence
or otherwise. Therefore, only data that would be necessary to avoid
such a situation need be disclosed. On the other hand, under Public
Law 87-653 the purpose of disclosure is to attain fair and reasonable
prices.
Consequently, as the cases are brought before administrative boards
and courts, and decided, the Government may find that, as a part of its
dealings with contractors, it has an affirmative obligation to disclose all
cost and pricing data which might reasonably be expected to sig-
nificantly affect the price negotiations.
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